Globalization and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Making a Rules-based Trading Regime Work by Khan, Haider & Liu, Yibei
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Globalization and the WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism: Making a
Rules-based Trading Regime Work
Haider Khan and Yibei Liu
GSIS, University of Denver
2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7613/
MPRA Paper No. 7613, posted 10. March 2008 14:37 UTC
  
Globalization and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 
Making a Rules-based Trading Regime Work 
 
 
 
 
                        Haider A. Khan 
Professor of International Economics 
Graduate School of International Studies 
University of Denver 
Denver, CO 80208 
hkhan@du.edu 
and 
Yibei Liu 
Graduate School of International Studies 
University of Denver 
                       yibei.liu@du.edu 
 
 
 
 2
Abstract: 
We discuss thje role of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in the context of a complex characterization of globalization.The 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is at 
present a controversial exercise at the international level. Reasonable people disagree 
as to whether it has enhanced and maintained equality between developing and 
developed countries. Through examining its concrete provisions, procedures and 
several important factors such as resource availability and political influence outside 
the WTO, it can be found that there are conditions under which the new rule-based 
DSM can indeed contribute to promoting developing countries’ status in the system . 
Consequently, it can  provide them with more power to defend their own interests. 
However, the DSM still does not eliminate the power-based relationships among 
countries. Developing countries are still affected by biases, which stem from several 
sources such as high financial and legal resource costs, political pressure generated 
outside the WTO, declarative WTO legal provisions, etc..A reformed WTO with less 
asymmetry of power will result in a higher level of global social welfare. 
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I. Introduction 
 
As one of the major outcomes of the Uruguay Round, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) is regarded as one of the central pillars of today’s 
multilateral trading regime. It is expected that this new rule-oriented dispute settlement 
mechanism (DSM) can replace the GATT’s power-based dispute resolution system, 
thus can bring more equality and protection to developing countries. Some researches 
support this claim. According to Holmes, Rollo and Young, in the DSM of the WTO, 
there is no strong evidence of a bias against developing countries either as 
complainants or respondents.1 In other words, the new DSM enhances equality 
between developing member countries and developed ones. 
However, there are also suspicious voices questioning whether the DSM can be 
really impartial. The fact that developing countries usually find themselves in a weaker 
position in the WTO compared with industrialized members may indicate that the 
DSM needs to contribute more efforts to improving the equality status of developing 
countries. Besson and Mehdi, through their empirical research, conclude that the DSU 
procedure is biased against developing countries.2 Shaffer points out three primary 
challenges to equality that developing countries have to face in the new DSM, 
including lack of legal expertise, constrained financial resources and political and 
                                                       
1
 See Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo and Alasdair R. Young, “Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the 
GATT?,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3133, September 2003. 
2
 See Fabien Besson and Racem Mehdi, “Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing Countries? 
An Empirical Analysis” (paper presented at the International Conference on Policy Modeling, Paris, France, June 
30 – July 2, 2004). 
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economic pressures.3 Hoekman and Mavroidis also argue that the WTO inherits all of 
the asymmetries that arise when there are substantial differences in bargaining power, 
since it rests on decentralized enforcement of international obligations.4 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the new rule-based DSM of the 
WTO brings about more equitable outcomes among participants, especially, whether 
the developing members under the new mechanism enjoy more equality and have more 
power to protect their self-interests. Our argument is that while it is true that relative to 
the GATT mechanism, the DSM better equalizes power disparities between developing 
and developed countries, the new system is still more favorable to industrialized 
members than to developing ones, and there are many other obstacles in developing 
countries’ way of pursuing equality. 
This paper has six sections. After this introduction, next section provides the 
framework of globalization in which the WTO is embedded. Section III provides a 
brief overview of the DSM framework. Section IV analyzes how the new DSM brings 
more equitable outcomes for developing countries. Section V elaborates the reasons 
why developing members still do not possess sufficient equality under the new 
mechanism. Section VI concludes. 
II. Globalization and WTO 
 
 
With frequent use the word globalization has by now acquired the status of an 
academic cliché. For many, the twin tendencies of the globalization of production and 
the emergence of a new international division of labor represent deep structural 
                                                       
3
 See Gregory Shaffer, “The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation,” World 
Trade Review 5, no.2 (2006): 177-198. 
4
 See Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, “WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance,” 
in Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-active Agenda, ed. Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), 131-146. 
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transformation of the world economy. In some sense, this is clearly true. But as some 
observers have pointed out (Harris, 1998, Khan, 1998) the word globalization, as 
commonly used, is largely a descriptive and not an analytical category. Furthermore, as 
a descriptive term its proper use requires a historical perspective that is often missing 
in the vast and growing literature. When viewed historically, it appears that 
globalization is a contradictory process of international economic integration that was 
severely interrupted by the first world war, the great depression, and the second world 
war. The emergence of the Bretton Woods framework can be seen as a way to integrate 
the world with respect to trade while controlling the flow of private capital. The 
demise of Bretton Woods has set in motion forces of capital account liberalization that 
are often the most visible aspects of ‘globalization’. However, even this process is 
fraught with new instabilities as evidenced by the Mexican and — more recently and 
even more dramatically — by the Asian financial crisis. At the same time integration 
of trade even within the standard neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
would imply a fall in the wages of unskilled workers of the north thus increasing 
inequality there (Krugman, 1996; Wood, 1994). The south is supposed to experience a 
more equalizing effect through trade; but empirically, there is very little evidence of 
this happening. Therefore, it is necessary to treat the rhetoric of globalization with 
caution. At best, we are experiencing a `fractured’ globalization (Harris, 1998).  
 
Nevertheless, during the past few decades, the structural changes that took 
place in the world economy have brought about increased cross-border economic 
relations and, relatively speaking, a global economy. The internationalization of trade 
and foreign investment, aided by the worldwide deregulation of financial markets, has 
promoted economic integration and regional unions (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997).  A 
new division of labor and a qualitatively different type of resource utilization, 
production and capital accumulation have emerged. The most significant effect of the 
recent structural change in world economy has been the creation of global 
interdependence and an economic global village.  
 
Although integration of the world economy is not exactly new, these structural 
changes have added up to a qualitative alteration in the organization of global markets, 
namely, one involving a shift away from international trade towards international 
production and the domination of international finance and the man-made brainpower 
industries (Thurow,1996). As Cook and Kirkpatrick (1997) put it, 
 
The internationalization of economic activity is not a 
new phenomenon...The recent growth in international 
integration is qualitatively different, however, from the 
earlier expansion of international trade, in that it has 
been characterized by the intensification of economic 
linkages  
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that transcend national boundaries, often at the 
functional level (p. 55). 
  
 In the previous years of economic integration, international trade and the reduction 
of trade barriers played the leading role in integrating the world economy while in 
today's global economy the main key players are multinational corporations and the 
growing finance and capital markets as well as information and computer technologies. 
 
Since the early 1980s, multinational corporations have increased not only in 
number but have also seen their share of foreign investment grow tremendously. In the 
early 1990s, there were about 37,000 multinational corporations that controlled some 
170,000 affiliates and the global stock of FDI constituted about $2 trillion (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1997). Today, some multinational corporations' turnover is greater than 
the GNP of some developing countries. 
 
Globalization has also been enhanced by the rising importance of the financial 
market and financial institutions that are dominating global economic relations. 
Deregulation of the financial market and liberalization of foreign exchange policies 
have increased the flow of finance between countries and brought about the integration 
of the world economy. 
  
As the effects of globalization and regionalisation are felt in every part of the 
world, social scientists have begun examining and debating these two concepts, their 
relationships, and the implication they are likely to have on the growth and welfare of 
developing countries. Among scholars there are clearly areas of dispute. Some scholars 
such as Hirst (1995) question whether there is such a thing as a globalized economy 
while others (Thurow, 1996; Ohmae, 1996) suggest that a qualitatively new form of 
economic integration has set the stage for the emergence of globalization and 
regionalization. Also, social scientists debate whether globalization and regionalization 
are enhancing the welfare of developing countries or marginalizing them, and thereby 
perpetuating regional and socioeconomic inequality. 
  
In this paper we will examine the essence of globalization and regionalization, 
their relationship within the context of WTO, and the implications they may have for 
developing countries. We will also point out the contradictions between the DSM in its 
current state  and the local needs and sensibilities in developing countries. At the end, 
we will see that this contradiction points to a need for understanding both the structural 
and normative aspects of globalization especially as it relates to development. 
 
Fractured Globalization Within a Normative Framework of Analysis 
  
 As mentioned at the beginning, globalization has been the buzz-word of the 1990s. 
As a process of change, globalization extends beyond the realm of politics and 
economics to embrace science, culture and lifestyles (Griffin and Khan, 1992). As such, 
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globalization is a "multi-dimensional phenomenon applicable to a variety of forms of 
social action--economic, political, legal, cultural, military and technological--and sites 
of social action, such as the environment" (Perraton et al, 1997: 258).  
There is no consensus among scholars as to the definition of globalization, or 
its effect on our lives and behavior. Some scholars have attempted to explain 
globalization as a political concept (Gills, 1997) while others elucidate the concept 
within the framework of recent economic, political and environmental developments 
(McGrew, 1992). Some focus on the positive impact of globalization; still others 
emphasize its adverse effects on income and social inequality, women and the poor 
(Sen, 1997, Gills, 1997).  Others underscore the impact of globalization on the nation 
states and argue that "nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of 
participation in the global economy of today's borderless world" (Ohmae, 1996:11). 
Yet others focus on the contradictory forces of integration and fragmentation in a 
postmodern world (Khan, 1998; chapters 6 and 7). 
 
Since globalization has significant implications for numerous nations, 
individuals and communities, it is imperative to clearly define and examine its 
implications. A sine qua non for this is to conceptualize the term clearly. This is what 
we intend to do. In simple terms globalization refers to the integration of the world 
economy in such a way that what is unfolding in one part of the world has clear, 
sustained and observable repercussions on the socioeconomic environment and 
lifestyles of individuals and communities elsewhere.  As McGrew puts it, 
globalization is "the forging of a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between 
the states and societies which make up the modern world system, as well as the process 
by which events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have 
significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the 
globe" (1992, p.262). However, in order for the term to have genuine analytical 
significance it must be a part of a theory of globalization.  Furthermore, in order for 
significant policy implications to emerge the theory must have a normative focus as 
well. Khan (1998) has proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world. In 
brief outline the structural forces in the global economy push towards integrating 
markets and regions. However, many markets are embedded in national economies; 
there are also non-market aspects of social and cultural lives of people that are 
threatened. As a result we find the contradictory phenomena of McWorld and Jihad 
(Barber, 1995). The creation of a genuine global society, which many see as the 
ultimate outcome of globalization then necessitates meeting the requirements of global 
justice. Khan (1998) mentions at least 5 areas, where the norms of global justice must 
evolve (among others): 
 
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric 
system of payments which penalizes the deficit countries by forcing 
only them to bear the costs of adjustment needs to be made a global 
burden sharing institution. The World Trade Organization, similarly, 
needs to acknowledge the historical imbalances in the world trading 
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system. For example, specialization according to static comparative 
advantage may lock the developing countries in a relatively backward 
situation in the emerging global division of labor. 
 
2. International capital flows:  From the perspective of many people in 
the developed economies capital flight to LDC’s (with or without free 
trade agreements) may constitute a barrier to well-being, at least in the 
short-run. At the same time foreign direct investment in LDCs may 
create only low-wage, marginal jobs (Wood, 1994). A just approach to 
FDI must consider the effects on both the north and south in terms of 
self-determination. A controlled capital flow accompanied by 
improvements of wages and working conditions in the south may be the 
most desirable solution. 
 
3. International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has 
been increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what 
justice demands in terms of the relationship between the north and 
south. Other things being equal, the enforcement of strict environmental 
standards would seem to be just. However, such standards may destroy 
the livelihood of some people in the south, it is sometimes argued. A 
global tax and transfer scheme would seem to be the precondition for 
applying a global set of environmental standards. The transfer of 
ecologically sound technology systems from rich to the poor countries 
is a precondition for justice in this sphere. 
 
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing 
discussion pinpoints the need for giving people the economic 
wherewithal in order for them to develop their social capabilities. Most 
studies (e.g., Adelman and Robinson, 1978; Khan, 1985; James and 
Khan, 1993) have discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the 
poor hampers poverty alleviation strategies. Redistributing assets and 
developing their human capital so that the poor can have access to 
markets becomes a major necessity in our normative framework. In 
most parts of the world this will require structural reforms rather than 
marginal policy interventions. 
 
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be 
assessed carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender 
inequalities that so far have affected women’s capabilities negatively 
demand unequivocally that policymakers pay careful attention to 
enhancing (or at least not decreasing) women’s capabilities. Will the 
globalization help women to overcome social limitations ranging from 
lack of nutrition to limits on participation in social, economic and 
political life? Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. In so far as many 
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developing country women do not possess skills for the global market 
place, globalization is already hurting them. 
 
 These five examples are meant to be illustrative only. By no means do they 
exhaust all the pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For 
example, we could add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with 
globalization and its implications for justice). But they do illustrate both the problems 
and prospects for justice in the age of globalization. One of the major political 
problems we have not discussed so far is the weakening of national sovereignty that 
the call for global economic justice entails. Agreeing to a global mode of production 
and distribution constrained by the principles of justice does mean surrendering 
considerable authority to international agreements, conventions, and ultimately, 
perhaps to new international organizations. It should be observed, however, that even 
without the constraining role of justice the globalization process weakens national 
sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized countries (e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call 
for a just economy must confront this (as well as other issues such as weakening of 
traditional cultural modes of living) head on in the light of reasonable principles. The 
fundamental message is that among these principles that of freedom as rational 
autonomy of the individual must be the principal one. This is one rational (perhaps the 
only one) approach if we are to avoid both the Scylla of Jihad and the Charybdis of 
McWorld. 
  
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real 
economic, financial and technological integration. Following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including interest 
rates and exchange rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of capital 
between nations. Until then the world financial system was governed by the Bretton 
Woods agreement of 1945 which provided for fixed exchange rate where currency 
values were expressed in terms of dollars and gold. When the system was abolished in 
1971 by the Nixon administration and replaced by a floating exchange rate, the 
grounds for a global market were laid. 
 
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation that became the "only game in town" 
following the ascendance of political conservatives -- Reagan in the U.S., and Thatcher 
in Great Britain. It was further reinforced by the collapse of the former socialist 
countries and the emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged 
school of thought (Falk, 1997). All these factors created a conducive environment for 
the free movement of goods including capital goods, and services as well as finance, 
thereby seemingly creating an integrated global economy.  In the following section 
we discuss the main causes of this contradictory but nonetheless integrating moment in 
the world economy. 
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Causes of a Fractured Globalization 
 
There are several factors that lie behind the emergence of globalization. One of 
these factors is the growth of the global financial market. Recently, international 
finance has increased more rapidly than world trade and has become an important 
element and the driving force behind global integration.  As Drucker notes, "capital 
movements rather than trade in goods and services have become the engines and 
driving force of the world economy" (quoted in Yeung and Lo, 1996: 19). Facilitated 
by deregulation and the liberalization policy of western countries, international capital 
has increased both its mobility as well as its turnover.  According to The Economist, 
in 1995 
 
 …$1.2 trillion of foreign exchange swapped hands on 
a typical day. That is roughly 50 times the value of 
world trade in goods and services. In the early 1970s, 
prior the liberalization of the world's capital markets, 
the value of currency trading was only six times 
greater than the value of "real" trade (1997:93). 
 
 With an emerging Eurocurrency now in place as the’euro’ and the accelerated 
growth of private capital, the traditional understanding of capital as being related to a 
particular country has 
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lost its meaning.  In other words, capital has become so internationalized that it has 
lost its national color, making it very difficult to control and regulate the flow of 
finance between nations. 
 
The second factor, which enhanced the integration of the world economy, is the 
demise of the Soviet System and end of the Cold War. The collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, has led to a widening of the global market and 
deepening of economic linkages. Today, except for North Korea, almost all countries 
of the world are integrated into and have become part of the global market. Even Cuba, 
which is ruled by a hard-line communist party, has allowed to a certain extent foreign 
investment to  play a substantial role in the economy of the country. 
 
Consequently, the world is no longer divided into a bipolar political order as it 
had been during the Cold War era when the United States and the Soviet Union were 
competing for ideological influence. Today, the competition between nations is no 
more for ideological supremacy but for market and scarce resources. In today's global 
economy geo-politics is out and geo-economics is in.  
 
The third factor, which lies behind globalization, is the growth of corporate 
activities. Global integration has been the result of the growing activities of 
multinational corporations. Today, the number of multinational corporations as well as 
their sphere of influence has expanded. To reduce the cost of production and maximize 
profit as well as to have competitive edge over others in conquering market, 
multinational corporations are transcending their national boundaries and are investing 
in other nations. Consequently, foreign investment has increased dramatically in recent 
years (see Table 1). This is partly facilitated by the revolution made in communication 
and transportation technology. 
 
 
Table 1: Growth of World-wide Direct Foreign Investment (1981-90) 
 
 Annual Growth (Per Cent) 
  
   1981-85                 
1986-90 
All Countries                
          Direct Foreign Investment Outflows          4          24 
          Gross Domestic Investment       0.5          10 
 
Developed Countries 
  
           Direct Foreign Investment Outflows          3          24 
           Gross Domestic Investment          2          11 
   
Developing Countries                    
 12 
             Direct Foreign Investment         -4           17 
             Gross Domestic Investment         -3             
9 
 
Source: United Nations, World Investment Report, (New York: United Nations, 1993, 
p. 15) 
 
 
 As Boisier notes, "the revolution made in technology has made it possible the 
'breaking down' of production process into different stages at different localities 
without losing efficiency and profitability" (1997). The high level of specialization has 
changed the structure of manufacturing in such a way that the production process 
allows different parts to be produced in different countries. The final goods are 
produced or assembled in a completely different country, thereby creating what is 
called a "global factory”. 
 
 Global integration has been facilitated by the growth of world trade associated 
with foreign direct investment (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997). As indicated in Table 2, 
the growth of world trade has outstripped that of world output by 4.2 times between 
1990-95. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Annual Growth of World Trade and GDP, 1950-95 
(Percentage) 
 
 
 
 
1950-60 
 
1960-70 
 
1970-80 
 
1980-90 
 
1990-95 
 
World Trade* 
      
      6.5 
  
     8.3 
   
   5.2 
   
   5.0 
    
   6.2 
World Output       4.2      5.3    3.6    3.1    2.0 
Difference       2.3      3.0    1.6    1.9    4.2 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1997, p. 129). 
 
*Exports of goods and services on a national accounts basis. 
 
 
The fourth, and maybe the most important driving force behind globalization, 
is the revolution made in information, communication and transportation technology 
which has reduced telecommunication as well as transportation costs, and thereby 
diminished the importance of distance in economic activity (Boisier, 1997).  
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Between 1930 and 1996, the cost of a three minute telephone call between New 
York and London fell from $300  (in 1996 dollars) to $1 (The Economist, 1997a). The 
dramatic reduction in telecommunication and transportation costs “have, in turn, 
permitted closer integration between markets, consumers, producers and suppliers” 
(Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1997:58). 
 
Business activities, including selling and buying of goods and services, as well 
as other financial transactions can be conducted at a distance using telecom networks. 
This is further facilitated by the Internet and the other modern technologies that have 
not only reduced telecommunication costs but also made it easier to reach almost all 
parts of the world. Consequently, shopping through telephone and Internet, 
tele-conferencing, distance education through video and television, and even 
tele-working have become cost-effective and widespread practices. 
 
Table 3: Long-term Trends in Transport and Communications Costs (1990 US$) 
 
Year Average Air Transport Revenue 
Per Passenger Mile 
Average 3-Minutes Telephone Call 
New York-London 
1930 0.38 244.65 
1940 0.46 188.51 
1950 0.30 53.20 
1960 0.24 45.86 
1970 0.16 31.58 
1980 0.10 4.80 
1990 0.10 3.32 
 
Source:  World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992, p. 34). 
 
 
The decrease in transportation and communication costs means considerably 
narrowed "space" and shortened "time" that has made goods and factor markets very 
close and more interlinked (Straubhaar and Wolter, 1997). It also means greater 
mobility of people within and between regions. In developing countries, the relative 
decline in transportation costs combined with 
 
The push of miserable conditions at home and the pull 
of higher standards of living abroad are leading tens of 
millions of people to move from poor countries to rich 
countries just when unskilled labor is not needed in the 
wealthy industrial world (Thurow, 1996:9). 
 
The fifth factor that has led to globalization is internationalization of 
environmental problems such as global warming and acid rain. These global 
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environmental problems require global solutions, making international co-operation 
and policy co-ordination not only important but necessary. Here, however, the rhetoric 
has so far outstripped the actual institution building process on a global basis. 
One area where the institution building process has proceeded is international 
trade. We now look at WTO and the DSM in particular. 
 
 
 
III.The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) – A Brief Overview 
  
Settling disputes is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
which consists of all WTO members.5 It has the authority to set up panels, adopt or 
reject panel and Appeal Body (AB) reports, maintain surveillance of the 
implementation of decided rulings, and authorize limited trade transactions. 
The DSM encourages countries to first settle their dispute through bilateral 
consultation by themselves.6 If the discussion fails, the parties can bring the dispute to 
the DSB. Then the DSB establishes a “panel” composed of three experts to investigate 
the case, after which the panel issues a report with rulings or recommendations. Either 
side disagreeing with the report can appeal the report at the AB. After reviewing the 
case based on points of law rather than reexamining the evidence, the AB can uphold, 
modify or reverse the panel’s conclusions by issuing a new report. And the DSB needs 
to accept or reject the AB’s report, but rejection is only possible by consensus.7  
When the case has been decided by the DSB, the losing defendant must bring its 
                                                       
5
 See World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO – A Unique Contribution,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm . 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
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actions into line with the decided rulings or recommendations. If it does not comply 
with the rulings in a certain period of time, and it also fails to reach a 
mutually-acceptable compensation in negotiation with the complaining side, the latter 
may ask the DSB for authorization to impose trade sanctions against the other side.  
Compared with the GATT mechanism, the DSM of the WTO, “a jewel in the 
crown of the Uruguay Round,”8 presents profound changes on several aspects: 
First, the DSM establishes a “single unified dispute settlement system,”9 in 
contrast to the multiple dispute settlement procedures under GATT. 
The second change is about the “automaticity”. One of the most decisive changes 
from GATT to the WTO mechanism is the introduction of “negative consensus.” 
Unless there is a consensus within the DSB to reject the establishment of a panel, the 
panel must be set up. Similarly, decisions of the panel and the AB are also 
automatically adopted unless there is a DSB consensus to reject them. 
Third, the establishment of the new appellate procedure and institution – the AB – 
is another important change. Though the AB only deals with legal issues and does not 
have the right to reexamine the evidence, it still enhances the possibility that different 
voices can get heard. In practice, many cases step into the appellate procedure. Of the 
78 panel rulings issued from 1995 to 2003, 53 cases (68%) have been appealed.10 
Fourth, the new DSM procedure has fixed timetable for each step (Table 1). This 
reform not only makes countries able to foresee the time and costs for dispute 
                                                       
8
 Karen J. Alter, “Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO’s Nes Dispute Resolution System,” International 
Affairs, 79, no.4 (2003): 784. 
9
 Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc., 2005), 86. 
10
 See Keisuke Lida, “Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?,” Global Governance 10 (2004): 210. 
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settlement, it also helps speed up the process thus enhances the WTO efficiency. 
Table 1. Stages in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process 
How long to settle a dispute? 
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc 
45 days Panel set up and panellists appointed 
6 months Final panel report to parties 
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members 
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) 
Total = 1 year (without appeal) 
60-90 days Appeals report 
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report 
Total = 1y 3m (with appeal) 
Source: World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO – A Unique Contribution,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm 
 
Fifth, the DSM of the WTO has improved its participation and surveillance 
mechanism for decision implementation. The AB allows the participation of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which shows the increasing accessibility of 
the DSM.11 And the DSB decisions can be better implemented with its surveillance 
mechanism that was virtually non-existent in GATT.12 
Relative to the power-based GATT system, the DSM of the WTO moves toward a 
more rule-oriented mechanism. Many scholars expect that this reformed rule-based 
system can better protect developing countries from the unilateral exercises launched 
by strong powers, thus enhance the equality in international trade. Whether this is the 
case in reality needs further examination of the DSM.  
 
                                                       
11
 Ibid. 
12
 See Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction, 87. 
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IV. The Rule-Based System: Improved Equality for Developing Countries 
 
The Uruguay Round reforms have brought great influence on developing 
countries’ participation and performance in the WTO dispute settlement system. The 
establishment of a single organizational forum for managing disputes with formalized 
procedures and greater legal transparency certainly has brought about many positive 
results that improve the equality status of developing countries.  
How the new DSM Enhances Equality 
On the one hand, the new DSM in the WTO is a multilateral mechanism for 
dispute resolution, which provides developing countries with a more favorable 
environment than that under the bilateral mechanism. Under the rule-based DSM, all 
the members, no matter they are weak or strong, have the right to resort to the DSM to 
seek fair and reasonable resolutions for their trade disputes, which is a law-protected 
equality. The mechanism reduces the instability arising from countries’ unilateral 
actions. And it also increases the transparency of the dispute settlement procedure thus 
help enhance the fairness. 
First, the new DSM improves the bargaining power of developing countries. The 
system is based on formal legalized rules, thus members are “equal” in front of the law. 
Even the superpowers need to abide by the regulations. Thus developing countries gain 
more equality, and hence more power for equal bargaining. Just as Cameron and 
Campbell argue, resolving disputes through a judicial route is “particularly beneficial 
for smaller countries, as without the rules and procedures of the DSU and the extensive 
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obligations in the WTO agreements, they would not have the necessary bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the larger powers.”13 For instance, Brazil had not pursued a complaint 
against the EU under the GATT system since it knew the complaint would be blocked. 
However, under the new WTO mechanism, Brazil notified the EU that it would bring 
the dispute to the DSB for formal consultation, which is the first step of the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure. A few days later, the EU made concessions that it had 
previously held as impossible, and the dispute was resolved.14 Furthermore, while the 
GATT system might cripple weaker countries’ bargaining power by its “positive 
consensus” rule, the new WTO DSM improves the situation through the “negative 
consensus” framework, which greatly reduces the possibility of blockage. 
Second, from the angle of independence, under the power-based GATT system, 
the independence of developing countries was eroded because of their economic and 
political “dependence” on developed countries. Sometimes they could hardly express 
their real attitudes. Under the new WTO DSM, as a contrast, a certain level of 
independence is guaranteed by the fixed legal regulation system. Thus the rule-based 
arrangements for dispute resolution tend to produce more equal outcomes, mitigating 
power/wealth disparities.15 
Third, the general spirit of compliance with the result of the DSM is another 
optimistic indicator of improved equality. In this rule-based system, the major powers 
in international trade have indicated that “they will comply with the mandates of the 
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Dispute Settlement reports when they are finalized and formally adopted.”16 And even 
the most powerful players cannot defy the final rulings without risking harm to the 
institution.17 When developing countries file complaints against developed ones to the 
DSB, even if the result is negative to the developed side, the recommendations or 
rulings can still be implemented. This situation tends to “reduce asymmetries in 
post-agreement bargaining power”18 and enhance developing countries’ equality status 
in the phase of rulings implementation. Besides, countries now get easier access to 
countermeasures provided through cross-retaliation, which makes developing countries 
able to impose pressure on developed ones. Thus, as developing members have more 
assurance as to the implementation situation of the DSM results, their equality status in 
the system is improved. 
On the other hand, considering the concrete DSU provisions, because of the 
increasing concern on developing countries’ particular needs and interests, the DSU 
provides plenty of provisions offering special favorable conditions to developing 
countries through the whole dispute settlement procedure. Thus developing countries 
can enjoy more equality with developed countries. 
Article 4.10 of the DSU calls for members to pay special attention to the particular 
problems and interests of developing countries in consultations. Article 12.10 allows 
for the extension of the consultation time-period. Article 8.10 states that a developing 
country involved in a dispute can request that the panel includes at least one panelist 
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from a developing member country if the other side is a developed state. And Article 
12.11 provides that the panel report must indicate the form in which the special and 
differential treatment rules of the DSU have been taken into account, if a developing 
country member involved in a dispute raises such rules.  
At the stage of implementation, according to Article 21.2 of the DSU, particular 
attention should be paid to matters affecting developing countries interests. As to 
surveillance, Article 21.8 states that if a case is brought by a developing country, the 
DSB needs to take into consideration not only the trade coverage of the challenged 
measures, but also their impact on the economy of the developing country concerned.  
Furthermore, Article 27.2 requires the WTO Secretariat to make available legal 
expertise assistance from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing 
member upon its request. And Article 24.1 calls for due restraint in bringing disputes 
against a least-developed country (LDC) and in asking for compensation or seeking 
authorization to suspend obligations against a LDC that has lost a dispute. 
Improved Equality Situation: the Data 
Compared with the GATT system, the DSM of the WTO has created a more 
equitable legal environment for developing countries to resolve trade disputes, with its 
rule-based mechanism and the concrete provisions paying special attention to 
developing members’ particular requests and interests. These improvements have 
enhanced the self-interest protection capabilities of developing countries. 
Within the new DSM, developing countries have gained more equality and more 
power to bring disputes to the DSB for resolution. Even if the other side is a developed 
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country or developed countries, the DSM of the WTO can encourage the developing 
members to solve the problem through this formal route.  
As indicated in table 2, until September 2000, 207 complaints had been brought to 
the WTO. Of these, 26% were brought by developing countries. Compared with the 
situation in GATT period, during which developing countries brought 16% of the total 
cases, developing countries under the WTO are more encouraged to use the new DSM 
for dispute resolution. 
Table 2. Number of Dispute Settlement Cases, 1995 through September 2000 
 Complaint by 
 Industrial countries Developing countries 
Number of cases 154 53 
Share of Total cases (%) 74 26 
Share of cases under GATT (%) 84 16 
Source: Valentina Delich, “Developing Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement System,” in 
Development, Trade, and the WTO, ed. Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002), 76. 
Between 1995 and 2001, roughly one-third of WTO disputes have involved 
developing countries as plaintiffs, which is higher than their share of disputes initiated 
under the GATT (1947-1994) period.19 And during the four and one-half years from 
2000 to June 2004, developing countries initiated 62% of the consultation requests, 
which developed ones only initiated 38%.20 Especially, 51% of disputes in 2000 and 
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71% percent of disputes filed in 2001 came from developing countries.21 
From these data we can see that compared with the GATT system, the DSM under 
the WTO indeed has enhanced the possibility that developing countries use this formal 
mechanism for dispute resolution. This is the natural outcome of the improved equality 
situation and strengthened rights protection power of developing countries. 
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V. Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism:  
Situation and Explanation 
 
Indeed, the new DSM of the WTO better enables developing countries to use the 
system for trade dispute resolution. However, many developing members of the WTO 
are long being among the critics of the new system’s inequality since its 
establishment.22 And if we take a closer look at some other numbers, the picture is not 
that optimistic. Moon’s research shows that under the new DSM of the WTO, 
developing countries now are much more frequently taken to court by developed 
countries, as the percentage of “developed countries as complaints and developing 
countries as defendants” increased considerably from 9.5% under the GATT system to 
28.1% under the WTO mechanism.23 Reinhardt and Busch find out that “developing 
countries are one third less likely to file complaints against developed states under the 
WTO than they were under the post-1989 GATT regime.”24 Smith further notes that 
between 1995 and 2002, only a handful of developing countries were involved as third 
participants. Excluding the EU-banana case, the grand total came to 28 appearances by 
14 developing governments. In contrast, during this period, only 9 developed countries 
made a combined 65 appearances as third parties.25 Additionally, till today, the least 
developed countries (LDCs) are even totally absent in the DSM of the WTO.26  
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All these evidences show that developing countries are still somewhat 
marginalized under the DSM of the WTO. If this situation continues, in the long run, 
the WTO legal system may be more and more shaped by developed members’ interests 
and wills, and developing countries may be left less space to stand in. Then what are 
the real situations and possible explanations of this inequality and marginalization of 
developing countries in the DSM?  
 
High Costs and Limited Resource Availability 
Financial Cost 
First, the costs of access of the DSM are very high. And compared with developed 
states, developing countries actually have fewer resources to invest to defend their 
WTO rights.  
It is usually a long process for the WTO to settle a trade dispute through the DSM. 
As table 1 indicates, approximately, a typical WTO dispute settlement procedure may 
cost 12 months (without appeal) to 15 month (with appeal), and it will be even longer 
if including the succeeding implementation phase. In the famous banana dispute, from 
the start at 4 October 1995 to 19 April 1999 when the DSB authorized the US 
suspension of concessions, the process lasted 43 months. And the DSB suspension 
authorization to Ecuador was on 18 May 2000, which made the course as long as 56 
months.27 Such a long procedure brings great cost burden. Bown and Hoekman in 
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their research point out that even just calculating the actual litigation and excluding the 
pre- and post-litigation costs, the bill for hourly legal services could run from $89,950 
for a low complexity DSM case to $247,100 for a high complexity case. And these do 
not include the costs of litigation support through necessary data collection, economic 
analysis, and hiring of expert witnesses for testimony, which may lead to another 
$100,000 to $200,000. Furthermore, other substantial overhead costs associated with 
many other aspects such as travel, accommodation, communication, paralegal and 
secretarial assistance all have to be paid. Thus a typical “litigation only bill” to an 
exporter for a market access case is roughly $500,000 and it even does not cover the 
resource costs of potential claim investigation in the pre-litigation phase and other 
public and political relation costs, which might be extremely high.28 
Except for the litigation costs, countries initiating disputes in the DSM face 
income losses from hindered trade during the dispute investigation period.29 For 
developing countries, especially those highly relying on their limited exports for 
national incomes, these potential income and market losses may be more unbearable 
than the litigation bills. 
High costs of WTO dispute settlement erode developing countries’ capability, 
especially those weaker ones’, to participate in the DSM. Compared with their 
developed peers, developing countries usually have fewer financial resources to spend 
on the WTO litigation. Generally, their economic sizes are smaller, their industries are 
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less profitable, their government budgets are limited, and their limited resources also 
have to be spent on many other social needs of their own. Thus the high costs actually 
lower developing countries’ status and make them less willing and less able to pursue 
dispute settlement through the DSM, which can be seen from their less appearance in 
the system. According to Shaffer, unlike the US and the EU, most developing countries 
cannot even afford to fly in officials from the capital for specific WTO meetings.30 
Then how can they stand the huge costs of dispute settlement? Furthermore, many 
developing countries tend to step into a vicious circle. They participate less frequently 
in the DSM because of high costs, but their less participation makes them not able to 
benefit from the economies of scale, that is, developed countries can spread the fix 
costs of developing internal legal expertise over more cases than developing states.31 
As a result, developing countries have to assume higher costs for individual cases. 
Financial inequality brings developing countries big obstacles of pursuing WTO 
dispute settlement. It is theoretically true that they can obtain fund or assistance with 
lower costs from sources such as private firms and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). But the problem is: the private sectors in developing countries are relatively 
weak and less profitable, and they typically view the WTO dispute settlement as the 
government’s job.32 And other institutions such as NGOs can hardly satisfy the 
increasing needs given the fact that developing countries are more and more involved 
in trade disputes and most of them do not have enough resources to invest. 
The high financial costs of the WTO dispute settlement trigger inequality in the 
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DSM. With abundant financial resources, developed countries can better afford the 
WTO dispute settlement thus may use it more frequently than developing states do. 
Hence it comes out that developing countries do not make full use of the DSM. 
Limited Legal Resources 
Except for financial investments, legal resources, especially the legal expertise, are 
also essential for WTO dispute settlement. For instance, in the panel phase, the written 
request for the panel establishment has to precisely define and limit the scope of the 
dispute; and the parties involved need to exchange multiple sets of written submissions, 
present views orally in oral hearings, and answer the questions raised by the panel. All 
these activities require sufficient legal expertise support. Actually, the shortage of 
special expertise, personnel and information for legal activities is an important reason 
why developing countries are suffering inequality and unfavorable outcomes in the 
DSM. 
Industrialized states such as the US and the EU, also the major players in the WTO, 
are well equipped with legal experts in the area of the WTO legal system, and they 
have a worldwide network of commercial and diplomatic representation that feeds 
their systems with relevant data.33 In contrast, developing countries have limited legal 
expertise and it is harder for them to collect data and information because of the lack 
of networks. Many developing countries have only one or two lawyers to address 
WTO issues.34 When small developing countries are involved in disputes with the US 
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or the EU as the other side, the developing ones are obviously in a disadvantageous 
position concerning legal expertise supply. Though they can buy legal expertise, 
“scarcity of national administrative resources to identify and prepare cases is a major 
constraint.”35  Concerning data collection, when the European Commission (EC) 
realized its lack of such a system after the establishment of WTO mechanism, it hired 
consultants to identify and report on other countries’ trade barriers, which spurred 
many successful WTO complaints.36 In contrast, developing countries lack adequate 
financial as well as human resources to establish such a system in a short time. 
Developing countries, to certain extent, can improve their access to WTO 
litigation services. For example, according to DSU Article 27.2, developing countries 
can get technical help from the WTO Secretariat. They can also resort to the Advisory 
Center on WTO Law (ACWL) for legal assistance for dispute cases. And they can go 
to NGOs and other issue-based organizations or private firms for help. 
But the assistance methods’ accesses and effects are limited. Taking WTO as an 
example, its legal assistance services are offered by only two expert attorneys on a 
limited part-time basis, and the two experts advise developing countries disputants at 
most one day per week.37 And the DSU further requires that even the limited 
assistance can only be provided after a member has decided to bring a dispute into the 
DSM.38 Thus developing countries cannot use this assistance to help figure out their 
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“winning probability” thus help decide whether to bring the disputes to the WTO. 
Moreover, a large number of developing countries are designated as “inactive” for not 
having paid their assessed contributions to the WTO budget for more than 3 years, and 
such a designation implies that they are not able to receive technical assistance from 
the WTO, and a number of other privileges, such as the distribution of documents, are 
withheld from them. But these “inactive” countries are actually the poor ones that most 
need the WTO’s help.39 Similarly, the ACWL assistance may also encounter the 
problem of availability of its resources. On the one hand, the operation fund of the 
ACWL basically comes from individual countries, and a rich country may be hesitant 
to provide adequate fund to an organization that often provides litigation assistance 
directly challenging its own interests.40 On the other hand, even the limited resources 
have to be allocated on a fiercely competitive basis. Compared with developed 
countries, developing countries not only lack legal resources domestically, but also 
face difficulty in getting assistance from outside. 
The financial and legal resource constraints bring about inequality between 
developing countries and developed states in the DSM, by reducing developing 
countries’ capability to participate in the system. As Besson and Mehdi’s finding 
suggests, developing countries are unlikely to obtain a favorable outcome unless the 
asymmetry of capacity is corrected.41 
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Inequality Stemming from Power-Based International Relations 
The other kind of sources of inequality is about international relations among 
countries. The WTO is an international organization, the establishment and operation 
of which are made possible only if member countries are willing to give up a part of 
their sovereignty to make the institutional contract. This means actions of the WTO 
may be inevitably influenced by the international political and economic interactions. 
The DSM is also unexceptional. As what Moon points out, at the law-making stage for 
establishing the DSM, weaker states have to make concessions to stronger countries 
for the latter’s acceptance of a rule-based system, the result of which is the agreements 
advantageous to stronger actors.42 Thus from the beginning, the DSM regulations are 
more favorable to industrialized countries, and this argument is confirmed by Moon’s 
empirical analysis of whether developing countries are more frequently taken to court 
by developed states under the DSM because of application of its legal provisions.43 
In the rule-based DSM, power consideration and influence still cannot be denied. 
As Moon argues, “For reaching a legalized DSM agreement, there should be trade-offs 
between the stronger-actor-favorable content of law and the fair application of the 
law.”44 A question here is whether the WTO panels and AB can be really impartial as 
supposed. Potentially, as the experts are from different countries whose self-interests 
may also be influenced by powerful states, they cannot totally get rid of the political 
impact, though this impact may be indirect. According to Garrett and Smith, even the 
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AB of the DSM, a basically rule-based institution which should be unbiased in front of 
the law, is also reluctant to make unequivocal adverse rulings against powerful 
countries on issues of considerable domestic salience.45 An important case here is the 
Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry dispute brought to the 
WTO by the US, the EC and Japan. Indonesia provided certain preferential conditions 
to its domestic automobile industry and products, which were permitted under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, but the panel deemed such 
arrangements were inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs). The panel’s final decision was: though such arrangements were 
permitted by one agreement, it still could not be continued since it violated the other 
agreement. In contrast, the panel’s attitude towards the US Special 301 Provision was 
different. Though the panel found that this provision was inconsistent with the WTO 
spirit, it still permitted the provision and did not bring forward any correction 
recommendations. From these cases, we can see the power politics have considerable 
influence and bring about inequality even in the rule-based WTO litigation system. 
Also, the powerful players can use other international political instruments to 
impose impact on weaker countries, while the latter are actually faced with limited 
degree of freedom to act. Particularly, since many instruments are outside the WTO’s 
jurisdiction, the WTO can hardly deter such actions. One important kind of political 
instruments is foreign assistance and economic preferential arrangement provided by 
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developed countries to developing ones. These preferential conditions and financial aid, 
to some extent, make the poor countries “dependent” on rich economies, thus the latter 
can ask for favorable political and economic outcomes through imposing pressures on 
the former. It is not rare that developed countries use foreign aids to press forward their 
international political and/or economic interests. In the DSM, the developed countries 
can threaten to reduce or even withdraw the economic benefits they provide to poor 
countries, and the latter, especially the small ones, can do little to counter such threats 
thus may retreat and choose not to file the dispute to the WTO. Such actions are 
basically outside the WTO’s authority, thus the institution can hardly do anything 
about this international political and economic inequality. Through Zejan and Bartels’ 
empirical study of the relationship between aid to developing countries and their 
activity in the DSM, it is found that donor countries tend to penalize developing 
countries that seek to protect their interests through the DSM, and the amount of aid 
received affects the probability of a developing country to initiate a dispute.46 
Indeed, international politics is intertwined with international economic issues and 
“power” is greatly influencing the operation of international law. Even the military 
expenditures gap appears to negatively affect the probability of developing countries to 
win a dispute.47 While developed countries can use different political instruments to 
influence developing countries’ actions in and outside the DSM of the WTO, it is hard 
to say there is a real equality in this system. 
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Compensation Inadequacy and Lack of Enforcement Capability – Another 
Source of Inequality 
Except for the inequalities coming from the imbalances of political power and 
economic burden, even if developing states launch a complaint and win, it is also 
difficult for them to get adequate compensation or fully enforce the rulings. 
Inadequate Compensation 
 As mentioned earlier, the time period, from starting a complaint to the end when 
the complaining side gets the DSB’s permission to impose limited trade sanctions 
(“suspend concessions or obligations”), is a very long procedure. But the WTO 
retaliation mechanism prescribes that complaints cannot unilaterally take retaliatory 
actions unless the DSB makes decisions and permits them to, which means that the 
defendant side is able to violate the WTO laws and hurt the other side’s interests 
during the long time-period, until the WTO recognizes and decides to take action to 
correct the violations. With economic strength, developed countries can relatively 
easily affect developing economies even just in a short time. Thus it is possible that 
before the DSB authorize them to impose trade sanctions, the developing countries’ 
domestic markets and internal economic capabilities have already been badly harmed. 
For those small developing states, this situation may be even worse. 
 Even if a developing country as complaint wins in a dispute, the compensation 
methods under the DSM are limited. Usually it comes out in the forms that the losing 
defendant withdraws the measures found inconsistent with WTO law, or the winning 
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complaint gets authorization from the DSB to impose limited trade sanctions. Under 
the current “retaliation-as-compensation” approach, there is no room for retroactive 
compensation or punishment measures that can help developing countries make up for 
its previous economic losses that have been already caused before the decision is made. 
Even if the defendant side corrects its action after the dispute, the complaint still has to 
assume the economic losses generated before the correction. For developing countries 
particularly, while their economies are generally weak and vulnerable to outside 
impact, such burden may be too heavy for them to bear. 
Lack of Enforcement Capability 
 It is also arguable whether developing countries possess adequate enforcement 
capability to fully implement the WTO rulings or recommendations even if the results 
are favorable to them. Under the DSM, the final dispute settlement decisions are 
supposed to be implemented on a decentralized, bilateral basis. The DSM relies 
entirely on state power for enforcement of its rulings.48 It may be hard for a 
developing country to raise tariff rates on certain products imported from a developed 
country, even if it is authorized to, since this action may hurt itself in turn at the end. 
With a relatively weak economy, a developing country may depend on certain 
imports from developed countries for development; if the products included in the 
retaliation are actually essential for its own growth, it can hardly be expected that the 
developing country will really deter or limit the imports. But onsidering the other side, 
since most developing countries’ markets and economic power are relatively small and 
                                                       
48
 See Pilar Zejan and Frank L. Bartels, “Be Nice and Get Your Money – An Empirical Analysis of World Trade 
Organization Trade Disputes and Aid,” 1027. 
 35 
weak, whether or not they take retaliatory actions to developed countries’ products 
does not bring much difference to the developed economies, unless they retaliate in 
alliance, which does not usually happen. Thus, while the retaliatory actions taken by 
developing countries to developed states cannot bring much danger or worries to the 
latter but may incur negative consequences to the users themselves, developing 
countries actually do not possess real equality with developed countries because of the 
asymmetry of enforcement capabilities. 
 
The DSU Provisions – Inequality behind the Articles 
Taking a closer look at the DSU provisions, there is also an interesting story. On 
the one hand, the Uruguay Round agreement provisions generally demonstrate that 
strong countries are real beneficiaries.49 The WTO expanded its coverage to areas 
such as investment (Agreements on Trade-Related Aspect of Investment Measures, 
TRIMs), intellectual property rights protection (Agreements on Trade-Related Aspect 
of Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPs), service trade (General Agreements on Trade in 
Services, GATS), etc. Because of these agreements, disputes in these areas now can be 
brought into the DSM. While most of the agreements reflect developed countries’ 
interests, developing countries are actually in an unequal position.  
On the other hand, analyzing the special DSU provisions which aim at improving 
developing countries’ status, it is found that they are more declarative than operative.50 
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For instance, the Article 4.10 requires that special attention should be paid to the 
particular problems and interests of developing countries during consultation phase. 
But this article does not point out concretely on what specific aspects and to what 
extent the “special attention” should be paid. Since there is no specific implementation 
measure, in practice it is hard to evaluate whether member countries have really and 
adequately complied with this provision. And Article 21.2 has the similar problem.51 
Furthermore, several other provisions regarding special and differential treatment 
may be difficult to apply, though they seem to be favorable to developing countries. 
For example, Article 21.7 states that the DSB must consider what further and 
appropriate action it might take in addition to surveillance and status reports, if a 
developing country has raised the matter. But it has not been used by any developing 
country. According to Delich, the reason here is probably that the country has to devote 
large amounts of resources to analyze and follow the case development, and 
developing countries hardly possess sufficient resources to do this.52 Similarly, as 
discussed earlier, the provisions regarding technical assistance to developing countries 
are not able to be adequately applied for the sake of the limited resources availability. 
And till now, the provisions related to LDCs seem to be “useless” since no LDC has 
been involved in any dispute. Thus, while the DSU provisions, even those favorable to 
developing countries, cannot be fully applied, further efforts are needed to improve the 
inequality between developing states and developed ones in the DSM. 
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 Article 21.2 of the DSU states that particular attention should be paid to matters affecting developing countries’ 
interests with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement. 
52
 See Valentina Delich, “Developing Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement System,” 74. 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
 In this paper, we have attempted an examination of the DSM in a globalizing 
environment. The DSM of the WTO is a multilateral rule-oriented mechanism. 
Although many problems still exist, with its recently acknowledged special concern 
about developing countries’ particular needs and interests, it has brought about many 
positive and favorable changes to developing member countries’ status. From the 
perspective of equality, weaker states now possess a relatively better environment and 
more power to defend their WTO interests through this new dispute settlement system.  
However, developing countries still do not enjoy a really neutral playing field 
where they can really trade equitably and efficiently with developed states. Though the 
DSU provisions are not biased literally, developing countries are not able to fully take 
advantage of the DSM in practice, even if certain provisions are supposed to favor 
them in principle. Since they do not have adequate financial and legal expertise 
resources, they can hardly bear the high costs of settling disputes through the DSM. 
Because of the unevenness of political power between developed states and developing 
countries, the latter group is in a disadvantageous position in the DSM given the 
political pressures they may suffer outside the WTO. The developing countries’ lower 
status is also due to their inadequate capability to enforce the dispute settlement results, 
even if the outcomes are favorable to them. Furthermore, the real practical effects of 
the DSU provisions regarding developing countries also need further examination. 
Thus, in the practice of the DSM, developing countries are not enjoying a really 
 38 
equal status as developed states do.  
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